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1. Introduction
The proliferation of countertrade practices and their increasing impact on
international trade has prompted serious reviews of the nature and extent of
such practices. For the most part, these analyses have focused on the mecha-
nics of countertrade and its economic effects. To date, little attention has been
directed at the possible implications of countertrade under the rules currently
governing the international trading system and embodied in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT") [1]. This article examines the
extent to which countertrade practices are consistent with the generally recog-
nized rules of international trade.
Countertrade practices as such have not been seriously considered in the
GATT. This lack of attention may be attributed to several factors. Counter-
trade is most often used by nonmarket economy countries, few of which have
joined the GATT [2]. Moreover, because trade with these countries is relatively
modest, private companies and the U.S. Government have preferred to encour-
age trade rather than complain vociferously about countertrade practices
where they have arisen [3]. Countertrade has been viewed as a necessary evil to
be tolerated because of a desire to encourage trade while accommodating the
foreign exchange needs of most nonmarket economies. Recently, however,
countertrade has become a matter of serious concern because its use has
become more widespread. Countertrade practices are popular in developing
countries. Some developed countries have also encouraged such deals, espe-
cially with developing countries, in order to secure access to raw material [4].
Analyzing countertrade with respect to the GATT will prove helpful for
several reasons. First, an examination of countertrade in terms of the GATT
demonstrates the fundamental incompatibility between countertrade practices
and the framework for trade envisioned by the GATT drafters. Second, the
GATT rules may provide analogies from which principles may be drawn to
govern the use of countertrade. Finally, to the extent that the GATT rules
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cannot be used to deal with the trade-distorting effects of countertrade, new
rules must be developed.
2. The structure of GATT
The GATT is essentially a contract among sovereign nations under which
they mutually agree to limit their freedom of action to regulate international
trade [5]. The centerpiece of this system is a set of tariff schedules specifying
the maximum rates that GATT members may charge as customs duties [6]. For
almost thirty-five years and through seven rounds of multilateral negotiations,
GATT members have concentrated their efforts on the elimination of tariffs.
Their success in this endeavor is evidenced by the generally low level of tariffs,
which may be responsible for an increase in international trade.
The elimination of tariffs as a major obstacle to trade has shifted the focus
in the GATT to the set of rules that initially were designed to protect the value
of tariff concessions [7]. Several attempts have been made over the years to
improve the basic framework. The most recent attempt occurred at the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Negotiations during which codes of conduct were
developed to augment the rules regarding subsidies, dumping, customs valua-
tion, standards, and government procurement [8].
Taken together, the rules promulgated under the GATT constitute the legal
norms against which any form of governmental intervention in international
trade may be tested. In determining whether countertrade is consistent with the
GA TT principles, both the nature of the countertrade and the extent of
governmental involvement in this practice must be examined.
3. What is countertrade?
For purposes of this analysis, the term "countertrade" refers to the entire
range of practices whereby one country requires another to purchase from it as
a condition for allowing that country to sell to it. The following aspects of
countertrade are relevant to a GATT analysis: (1) the refusal to comply with a
countertrade requirement bars a sale from the noncomplying party to the party
imposing the requirement; (2) countertrade requirements have trade-distorting
effects that are not present in normal transactions in international trade; (3)
countertrade practices create risks for sellers that are not compensated for by
any significant advantages; and (4) countertrade is used to balance trade on a
product, transaction, or country basis. These effects have been identified in the
economic literature on countertrade. Although they may or may not be present
in a particular transaction, they are taken as given for purposes of the
following GATT analysis.
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4. The nature of governmental involvement in countertrade
The GATT rules regulate the behavior of governments, not individual
business entities [9]. As indicated above, an examination of the consistency of
countertrade with the GATT rules requires an examination of the extent of
government involvement in countertrade practices.
Two extremes of governmental involvement exist. In the first situation, if a
firm decides on its own to discriminate against imports or to impose certain
conditions upon importation (e.g. barter, buybacks, swaps), the decision
cannot be challenged; the GATT does not govern the decisions of commercial
entities. If, however, the country where the firm is located has a "buy
national" policy, the existence of this policy creates a presumption that some
form of state coercion is being used to influence the firm's actions. In such a
case, the GATT rules would apply to the government involvement but not to
the activities of the private parties.
At the opposite extreme is the state-controlled economy. Although the
drafters of the GATT considered this situation, they decided to deal just with
the problem of state trading enterprises and not with the problem of state-con-
trolled economies. Article XVII of the GATT imposes upon state trading
entities a rule of nondiscrimination and requires them to act solely in accor-
dance with "commercial considerations". Through the provisions of this Article,
the drafters attempted to approach state trading in the same manner they dealt
with governmental regulation of private trade.
The two situations discussed above raise the question of whether counter-
trade practices are the results of deliberate state regulation, and. if so, what
form that regulation takes. The discussion below focuses on three different
contexts in which countertrade practices may arise: (I) those where counter-
trade is required by law or regulation in an otherwise nonstate-controlled
economy; (2) those where countertrade is practised by a state trading enter-
prise, whose decisions cannot be easily characterized as either commercial or
noncommercial, in an otherwise nonstate-controlled economy; and (3) those
where countertrade is practised in a state-controlled economy. As state control
over the entire economy becomes more pervasive, the GATT framework
becomes less relevant because the GATT was designed to allow the free market
to function in an unimpeded fashion by placing limitations on government
interference with trade.
The GATT does not prohibit governmental protection of private trade
agreements, but does require such protection to take the form of tariffs. The
GATT also calls upon countries to negotiate the elimination of tariffs. The
GATT rules on nontariff measures attempt to restrict the use of other forms of
regulation. The more an economy is subject to complete state control. however.
the more avenues there are to frustrate the GATT scheme in ways that simply
were not anticipated by the drafters.
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5. Countertrade by law or regulation
Instances in which countertrade is required by law or regulation in an
otherwise free market economy are not common. Of the various forms of
countertrade, only offsets appear to be a common occurrence in developed
market economies. An examination of countertrade in this context is the
starting point for any overall GATT analysis because this is the context that
the drafters had in mind when designing the rules [10]. If imposed by law or
regulation, countertrade conflicts with a number of fundamental GATT rules.
Recognition of this fact makes it easier both to appreciate the problems posed
for the GATT when countertrade is practised by state-controlled economies,
and to understand why a different regime is necessary for managing trade
relations between East and West.
The following subsections demonstrate, first, that countertrade practices
have economic effects that directly conflict with the framework the GATT was
designed to preserve. Such practices are an instrument for direct governmental
regulation of trade and can be used to create the same distortions as a quota or
a tariff. Second, these sections establish a strong case that countertrade
practices violate any of a number of specific GATT Articles, including those
designed to protect against nullification or impairment of tariff concessions,
those requiring nondiscrimination (most favored nation ("MFN") and na-
tional treatment), and those prohibiting quantitative regulations.
5.1. GATT nullification or impairment
The basis for a GATT member's challenge of the practices of another
contracting party is Article XXIII. This article authorizes a complaint in any
case in which a member feels that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly... is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as a result of:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations.... or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of [the GAIT], or
(c) the existence of any other situation.
Article XXIII directs the parties to consult about the matter and, if no
settlement is reached, the contracting parties, acting in a judicial capacity, may
hear the complaints and make recommendations to the parties or give a ruling
"as appropriate" [11]. If the circumstances are "serious enough", the contract-
ing parties may authorize a specific form of retaliation: the complaining party
or parties may suspend the application of "concessions or other obligations"
under the GATT to any other contracting party or parties.
Both the GATT precedent and the understanding on the GATT dispute
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settlement mechanism, embodied in the Framework Agreement reached during
the Tokyo Round negotiations, establish that any government measure violat-
ing a GATT provision constitutes a priniafacie nullification or impairment of
a GATT benefit [12]. Once an infringement of a provision is shown. the
burden of proof shifts to the offending government to prove that nullification
or impairment of a GATT benefit has not occurred. If the accused country
fails to produce substantial evidence, the contracting parties must determine
whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify authorization of
remedial actions.
A more difficult case is presented when a complaining party alleges nullifi-
cation or impairment as a result of a practice not explicitly prohibited by the
GATT. Nevertheless, GATT panels have determined that certain practices
constitute nullifications or impairments, even though they do not conflict with
any particular rule. Such cases arise where the foreign practice upsets the
balance of concessions that have been negotiated in a trade agreement [13].
5.2. Most-favored-nation treatment
Article I of the GATT requires that contracting parties treat the products of
every other contracting party no less favorably than they treat the products of
the most favored nation. A strict reading of the language of Article I supports
the view that a countertrade requirement applying equally to all foreign
countries would not be inconsistent with this obligation because all foreign
countries are subject to the same requirement. Despite this view, countertrade
practices conditioning access to a country's market on purchases of an equiva-
lent amount of that country's goods are strongly reminiscent of the bilateral
arrangements which the unconditional most favored nation principle was
designed to prevent. Moreover, an extension of the logic of countertrade would
allow a country to negotiate a countertrade deal that covered all of its exports
to the importing country in return for equivalent purchases. This type of
bilateral balancing of trade is fundamentally inconsistent with Article I's
purpose of preserving the multilateral character of the GATT system.
5.3. Tariff concessions
Article II. paragraph 1, of the GATT incorporates into the basic agreement
the tariff schedules of each contracting party and requires that the protection
afforded any product be no greater than that provided for in the member's
schedule. Protection provided by countertrade requirements would be contrary
to this principle unless the contracting party had included the countertrade
requirements as a condition in its GATT schedule.
Article II, paragraph 4, addresses the situation where a contracting party
"establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a monopoly of the
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
R.M. Gadbaw / Implications of countertrade tnder GATT
importation of any product", and it stipulates that such a monopoly cannot be
used to provide protection "on the average in excess of the amount of
protection provided for in [the] Schedule". This provision could be used
against countertrade practices when the government of a country enforces the
countertrade requirement through an import monopoly that has been estab-
lished either formally or in effect.
5.4. National treatment of internal taoxation and regulation
Article III of the GATT states the basic principle of nondiscrimination in
the treatment of imported goods. It requires the taxation and regulation of
imports in the same manner as domestically produced goods. The basic rule of
paragraph I provides that.
laws. regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale of, offering for sale, purchase.
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
Countertrade requirements could be construed as quantitative regulations of
the use of imported products in specified amounts or proportions: the quanti-
ties of products to be purchased and used by the importing country are tied to
the foreign country's purchases of the former's locally-produced goods. The
practice thereby protects domestic producers by forcing the foreign exporter to
purchase goods in the domestic producer's own export market rather than
from competitors.
Paragraph 5 of Article II provides a more direct basis for challenging
countertrade practices. It bans quantitative regulations "relating to the... use
of products in specified... proportions which" require that the specified "pro-
portion of any product... must be supplied from domestic sources". This
provision has been used to challenge practices requiring a party to purchase a
certain amount of a local product as a condition for the party's sale of another
product. The European Economic Community in one case required domestic
importers and producers of animal feed in member states to purchase specified
quantities of dry milk for use in such feed. A GATT panel held this require-
ment to be a violation of Article III [14]. The same logic could be applied to
countertrade requirements.
In addition, paragraph 4 requires that rules forbidding the "internal sale,
offer for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use" be no less favora-
ble for imports than products of national origin. This provision could be used
against countertrade requirements that tie the level of imports to a required
level of exports.
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5.5. General elimination of quantitative restrictions
With the exception of duties, taxes, or other charges, Article XI of the
GATT prohibits restrictions on imports and exports, whether made effective
through quotas, licences, or "other measures". Countertrade requirements can
operate as quantitative restrictions on imports. If a firm is unable to export to
a country unless it accepts a countertrade requirement, the effect of the
requirement is no different from the effect of a conventional import quota
adjusted according to some domestic market criterion. For example, if a
country established a quota on the importation of a given product and then
adjusted the quota in accordance with the level of exports, the quota would
violate Article XI. Countertrade requirements have the same effect on individ-
ual firms and, therefore, violate one of the most significant GATT provisions.
6. State trading enterprises
Article XVII of the GATT provides that state enterprises or firms receiving
"exclusive or special privileges" from their respective governments must be
permitted to make purchases and sales involving imports or exports in a
manner: (a) consistent with the "general principles of nondiscriminatory
treatment" contained in the GATT, and (b) solely in accordance with commer-
cial considerations [15].
Paragraph l(c) of Article XVII applies these principles not only to controls
on "state enterprises", but to any firm under the jurisdiction of the host
government [16]. This provision is redundant in the context of a countertrade
requirement imposed directly by law or regulation. It could, however, be used
in situations involving indirect regulations, such as conditioning the receipt of
government financing, tax breaks, or other government assistance on accep-
tance of countertrade obligations.
6.1. The GA TT and state trading
The dilemma posed by state trading practices for the drafters of the GATT
is comparable to that confronting today's policymakers in their efforts to
grapple with countertrade issues. The drafters recognized that state monopolies
can exercise their discretion to buy or sell on a discriminatory basis and
thereby circumvent the GATT rules [171. This problem is compounded by the
difficulties of detecting and measuring the impact of such practices when
decisions are made without public scrutiny or disclosure. Moreover, the
drafters faced the practical reality that many countries utilized state monopo-
lies to secure revenue or regulate the trade in certain commodities.
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The drafters established some useful principles in Article XVII for dealing
with state enterprises, but the rules fall far short in their actual application.
Article XVII is drawn from the corresponding provisions of the International
Trading Organizations' Charter ("ITO Charter") [18]. This Article, also based
on an ITO Charter proposal of the United States [19], reflects an attempt to
treat state trading in a manner that is comparable to the GATT treatment of
governmental regulation of private trade.
6.2. Article XV11 and state trading
As indicated in subsection 6.1 supra, the basic rule of Article XVII is that
state enterprises are not allowed to discriminate in a manner inconsistent with
the principles of nondiscrimination set forth in other parts of the GATT. There
is some debate over whether this principle of nondiscrimination is intended to
encompass both national and MFN treatment or only MFN treatment. The
broader interpretation of nondiscrimination coincides with the basic U.S.
objective of subjecting state trading enterprises to the same principles applica-
ble to government regulation of private trade. Although on one occasion the
United States argued before a GATT panel for the broader interpretation, it
elected to settle the case before a panel decision was issued. The continuing
ambiguity in the scope of the nondiscrimination principle is evidence of the
desire of the United States and other GATT members to avoid the tough
questions in dealing with state trading.
Paragraph l(b) of Article XVII adds to the principle of nondiscrimination
the requirement that state enterprises shall "make any such purchases or sales
solely in accordance with commercial considerations,... and shall afford the
enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accor-
dance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such
purchases or sales". Application of the principles of "commercial considera-
tions" and "opportunity to participate" to countertrade practices, as well as
the application of paragraph l(a)'s principle of "nondiscrimination", involves
some major interpretative difficulties. The principles in both paragraphs are
vague and, despite the expectations of the U.S. drafters, no case law involving
the interpretation of Article XVII has emerged. Nevertheless, a strong case can
be made that countertrade involves both discriminatory effects and considera-
tions alien to those present in normal commercial transactions in violation of
Article XVII.
Paragraph 4 of Article XVII could also prove useful in dealing with
countertrade. This subsection refers to the disclosure of information relating to
the operations of state monopolies. Under this paragraph a GATT member
may be called upon to supply information about the operations of any state
enterprise related to the administration of the GATT. This notification require-
ment, adopted as an amendment to the GATT in 1957, has been implemented
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through a formal notification process. Every three years, countries maintaining
state enterprises are called upon to complete a GATT questionnaire designed
to elicit detailed information on the operation of state trading enterprises. In
particular, the questionnaire requests disclosure of the criteria used by the
enterprise to determine the quantities to be exported and imported. This
questionnaire, either in its present form or as appropriately amended, could be
used to elicit valuable information on countertrade practices; the information
could then be used as a basis for a careful scrutiny of such practices under the
GATT.
Finally, in addition to Article XVII, two other GATT rules are also
applicable to state trading. Article II, paragraph 4, requires that the protection
afforded by a state monopoly not exceed that provided for a particular product
in a country's Schedule of Concessions. Article XI, which prohibits quantita-
tive and other restrictions, expressly applies to state trading enterprises by
virtue of an Interpretive Note in Annex I. Thus, it can be argued that
countertrade practiced by state enterprises is inconsistent with the principles of
Article II regarding products covered by a tariff concession and Article XI.
7. State-controlled economies
Although the GATT text does not address the problems of accommodating
state-controlled economies, except to the extent of imposing certain criteria on
the operation of state enterprises, these problems were considered in the early
GATT negotiations. When the Soviet Union withdrew from those negotiations.
these problems became moot. and the provisions designed to deal with
state-controlled economies were eliminated from the GATT draft [20]. This
omission was intentional because it was thought that the GATT would not
have to address the problems presented by membership of such states because
the ITO, with its more comprehensive provisions, was expected to take effect
within a short time. The eventual rejection of the ITO meant that the GATT
had to accommodate state-controlled economies. In spite of silence in the
GATT agreement, ad hoc solutions have evolved to deal with the handful of
state-controlled economies that have joined the GATT since 1948.
One proposal, included in the 1946 ITO draft prepared by the United
States, but not included in the final ITO draft, required that a country with a
complete or substantially complete monopoly of its import trade be willing to
undertake global import commitments. The requirements of this provision
were imposed on Poland when it sought membership in the GATT in 1967. In
its Protocol of Accession. Poland undertook to increase the total value of its
imports from other contracting parties by "not less than 7 percent per annum"
[21]. The Polish formula is significant for purposes of approaching counter-
trade issues because it represents an alternative to the problematic application
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of GATT rules to an economic system that does not fit within the GATT
framework.
8. Conclusion
Countertrade poses serious issues in terms of basic GAIT obligations. The
problems are exacerbated by the fact that countertrade is most commonly used
by state-controlled economies; the GATT rules are difficult, if not impossible,
to reconcile with those countries' extensive government involvement in com-
mercial decisions. From a practical standpoint, it may be desirable to acknowl-
edge this conflict and create an exception for countertrade to the GATT rules
to draw these countries into the trading system. One should not ignore,
however, the threat that countertrade poses for the GATT system should its
popularity spread.
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